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WHAT CAN A COUNTRY DO TO GET MORE AID?
Helen Eisen and John White*
The statistical work summarised in this paper was undertaken by
Helen Eisen, to test a hypothesis advanced by John White in a
recently published book (The Politics of Foreign Aid, Bodley Head,
1974), to the effect that there is a regularity in flows of aid associa-
ted with certain types of historical situations. It seems clear from the
findings of this work that the original hypothesis is valid only for a
severely limited number of cases, and that the range of actions which
a country can effectively take tQ attract more aid, or even to main-
tain aid at an assured level, is narrower than is commonly supposed.
In particular, the work shows an exceptional degree of volatility in
the flow of aid to Latin American countries, which these countries
seem relatively powerless to affect.
Although the paper is in some respects critical of certain claims made
by the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, it should
be clear that the authors are deeply indebted to the DAC for the
increasing precision and detail of its aid statistics, without which an
analysis of the kind presented here would not be possible. The authors
also wish to thank Robert Cassen and Michael Lipton for useful
comments on an earlier draft.
Introduction
Studies of the geographical distribution of aid have in general been
concerned with classes of countries, compared on a world-wide basis,
and have focused attention on the question: why do some countries
get more aid, in relation to their size, than others?' The standard
approach is to take per ca pita aid receipts, either for a single year or
averaged over a period (seldom more than three years), and to corre-
late these receipts with various putative explanatory variables. The
massively uniform conclusion of such studies is summed up by Mike-
sell: "It is impossible to discern any economic rationale for the distri-
bution of aid, either overall or by agency or by donor country"
(Mikesell, 1968). The conclusion is the same whether one takes the
*Helen Eisen was a Research Officer at the IDS in 1972.John White is a Fellow
of the Institute of Development Studies.
See footnote on following page.
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figures for total financial flows or only official development assis-
tance, whether one takes aid from all sources or only from bilateral
donors, whether one takes figures for commitments, gross disburse-
ments, net disbursements or the net transfer. High aid receipts are
associated, not with need in any developmental sense, but with the
donors' pursuit of commercial or strategic interests, and with a
special relationship between donors and recipients, notably the re-
lationship of colonial dependency (DAC 1969 Review).
Statistically, the two variables most closely associated with variations
in aid receipts, as presented in the most familiar studies, are size of
country - the well established 'small country effect', which gives
countries with small populations higher per capita receipts than
countries with large populations
- and what the DAC terms the
'inertial element', which shows up as a very strong correlation be-
tween aid flows to recipients in different years. The DAC has laid
special emphasis on inertia in aid flows: the tendency of countries to
receive this year, relatively speaking, more or less what they received
The most extensive discussion of geographical distribution in these terms is to
be found in successive publications of the Organization for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development (OECD), in particular:(i)OECD The Flow of Financial Resources to Less-developed Countries
1961-1965, Paris, 1967, chapter VII;
(ii)OECD Development Assistance: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the
Development Assistance Committee: 1968 Review, Paris, 1969, chapter VII
(hereafter, DAC 1968 Review);
(iii)OECD Development Assistance: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the
Development Assistance Committee: 1969 Review, Paris, 1970, chapter V
(hereafter, DAC 1969 Review).
Other studies using the same approach tend to draw heavily on the DAC's
statistical work, as does this paper. An early example is I.M.D. Little and J.M.
Clifford, International Aid: A Discussion of the Flow of Public Resources from
Rich to Poor Countries, with Particular Reference to British Policy, Allen and
Unwin, 1965. Data for commitments rather than disbursements are analysed,
using similar methods and reaching similar conclusions, in P.D. Henderson, 'The
Distribution of Official Development Assistance Commitments by Recipient
Countries and by Sources', Bulletin: Oxford University Institute of Economics
and Statistics, vol. 33, no. 1, February 1971. Most of the general studies of the
economics of foreign aid include a chapter which follows more or less the same
lines: e.g. Raymond F. Mikesell, The Economics of Foreign Aid, Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1968, Chapter Nine; David Wall, The Charity of Nations: The Political
Economy of Foreign Aid, Macmillan, 1973, chapter VIII; John White, The
Politics of Foreign Aid, Bodley head, 1974, chapter II; etc.
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last year, with the conclusion that this "would seem to allay the
apprehension of less-developed countries that the amounts of aid
they receive are not predictable for more than one year ahead" (DAC
1969 Review).
Perhaps because of a measure of complacency induced by the
assumption of inertia, studies of the geographical distribution of aid
have paid relatively little attention to the question of changes over
time. This is a serious omission. Given the aim of most governments
of developing countries to increase their aid receipts, coupled with
their fears of a reduction in these receipts, identification of the
factors which cause changes over time would seem to have greater
operational relevance than static inter-country comparisons. The
focus on inter-country comparisons would seem to be yet another
manifestation of the predominance of a donor-oriented perspective
in the aid literature.
A second omission is the failure to explain variations within each
category. The concentration on very small countries in aid-giving is
not necessarily significant if it does not use up large absolute
amounts. In terms of the numbers of people affected and the volume
of resources committed, the fact that the per capita resource flow to
India in 1972 was one-fiftieth of the per capita flow to Malta is less
significant than the fact that it was one-fifth of the per capita flow to
Indonesia and one-eleventh of the flow to Brazil (DAC 1973 Re-
view). Operationally, comparing widely disparate countries may be
less useful than comparing like with like.
In an attempt to fill this gap in the literature, we have analysed
changes in the volume of aid to individual countries during the
1960s. Taking the assumption of inertia as our starting point, we
expected to be able to trace the flow of aid for each couhtry back to
some specific event in time which had set the volume at a continuing
level, and our hope was that we would be able to classify these events
in such a way as to give individual developing countries a reasonably
clear picture of the circumstances under which they could expect a
significant increase or decrease in their relative aid receipts. More
formally, the hypothesis to be tested was of the form:
A change in the annual flow of aid to a country in excess of X
per cent will be associated with events of types A, B and C, and
in the absence of further events of these types subsequent
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changes in volume will not exceed Y per cent for Z years.
As will be seen, the pattern sketched in this hypothesis, with sharp
changes in response to specific events followed by periods of relative
stability, was not found to be general. It would follow that the
interpretation put upon the appearance of inertia by the DAC, sug-
gesting that the distribution of aid, however 'irrational' is at least
predictable, is indeed too complacent.
The analysis was confined to major recipients, defined as countries
with populations of more than four million receiving annual average
commitments of official development assistance in the period
1967-69 in excess of $30 million. There were 39 such countries. One
reason for confining the analysis to major recipients was to avoid
distortions arising from large relative changes in small absolute
amounts. Another was to focus attention on what we saw as the
main problem, that of countries with large numbers of very poor
people receiving relatively small amounts of aid. The data used initi-
ally were for gross bilateral disbursements by DAC member
countries.
Disbursements rather than commitments were chosen for three
reasons: first, because the former are more easily comparable over
the period; second, because many aid agencies plan on the basis of
likely disbursements, and tailor their commitments accordingly;
third, because disbursements are 'real', whereas commitments some-
times turn out to lack substance.
We confined ourselves to 'Western' (i.e. DAC) bilateral donors, as
constituting a relatively homogeneous group. One possibility to be
considered was that increases in aid from the centrally planned
economies were a major stimulant. Also, we wanted to know
whether multilateral agencies were free of the preoccupations of
bilateral donors, as is commonly claimed, perhaps even consciously
performing a compensatory function to offset the vagaries of the
bilateral donors, or whether on the contrary they moved in step. (As
will be seen, we found the latter to be generally the case). Both of
these questions would have been obscured if we had started with
total flows from all sources. For the centrally planned economies,
we also had a problem arising from the fact that only commitment
data are available.
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Somewhat similar considerations governed our use of gross rather
than net data. Gross disbursements reflect most accurately the out-
come of current decisions. It is possible that one factor in these
decisions is the need to offset increases in debt servicing, in which
case variations in the net transfer should be found to be less than
variations in the gross flow. This possibility would be obscured if one
took net figures at the outset. (In fact, the figures give little support
to the belief that the net transfer looms large in donors' calculations.
Average fluctuations in the net flow are greater than fluctuations in
the gross flow).
Patterns of Change
Table 1 shows gross bilateral disbursements to the 39 countries in the
table I
Gross bilateral (DAC) disbursements to 39 major recipients, 1961-70
US $ million
noreS * not available
including until 1968 disbursements received for the Indus Basin Development Fund
ncludes Malaya, Sabah, Sarawak and unallocated, and until 1965 disbursements to Singapore
source OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Lees Developed Countries, 1960-64, 1965 and 196667,
and unpublished data for subsequent years.
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country 196f 1962 1963 1964 f965 1966 1967 1968 1959 f970
Algeria 453.70 403.41 279.86 229.72 148.51 127.79 108.11 117.06 99.66 120.69
Morocco 134.34 98.00 98.52 84.21 109.22 90.88 69.10 111.05 91.41 113.30
Tunisia 92.17 69,60 81.85 70.05 91.35 70.29 104.80 76.23 111.74 111.74
United Arab Republic 123.61 188.76 208.78 241.12 124.70 89.24 52.27 55.20 20.36 57.77
Cameroon t $ t 23.24 25.21 27.92 28.11 30.80 31.82 43,60
Zaire 60.22 114.25 104.39 107,32 136.21 89.68 93.86 68.84 75.00 86.50
Ethiopia 21.17 25.72 22.76 12.65 17.03 32.62 25.66 38.36 33.52 35.27
Ghana 2.61 5.59 17.76 19.86 45.49 79.71 71.92 85.66 76.94 59.65
Ivory Coast $ * * 34.70 31.25 39.53 34.29 40.20 46.17 57.13
Kenya 63.69 49.02 55.71 57.99 71.62 58.21 41.61 43.46 46.13 58.15
Madagascar s * * 38.05 41.12 34.57 34.26 31.75 31.75 32.08
Malawi 8.37 11.74 16.62 32.61 34.76 31.11 29.64 23.26 22.81 27.19
Nigeria 33.46 31.81 22.43 46.59 70.71 74.77 77.51 75.09 88.10 96.81
Tanzania 40.29 47.65 31.17 42.67 35.79 37.75 31.35 29.33 31.68 41.37
Uganda 21.14 28.47 20.51 21.51 20.29 24.84 21.23 19.01 20.28 26.57
Zambia 1.26 5.88 5.43 20.77 13.61 34.28 70.92 54.68 23.95 f6,48
Dominican Republic * 22.00 47.04 23.03 79.35 53.37 64.32 50.39 40.23 41.80
Guatemala 15,00 9.01 10.11 12.64 14.71 10.08 18.41 21.14 14.46 14.72
Meuico 116.07 69.52 53.10 79.56 83.59 100.85 114.29 156.50 91.22 126.29
Argentina 101.69 110.21 92.88 93.60 58.93 91.07 80.21 43.22 73.79 84.98
Bolivia 23.09 31.68 46.90 36.19 31.68 25.87 28.73 50.87 37.11 24.07
Brazil 321.35 201.13 223.65 259.14 257.85 337.66 224.66 295.61 237.27 248.34
Chile 141.78 150.10 151.46 139.39 125.15 141.20 117.15 203.33 159.81 117.64
Colombia 73.01 63.04 93.58 63.11 80.20 90.11 105.07 113.17 12470 147.02
Peru 11.43 31.22 30.46 39.49 73.78 75.43 56.47 50.67 66.40 78.75
Venezuela 29.01 89.02 48.18 27.39 38.19 47.84 52.56 42.57 57.98 41.44
Turkey 198.50 240.74 233.35 168.36 191.90 18595 172.13 188.95 184.11 176.43
Iran 138.82 65.32 44.88 24.90 39.10 43.00 64.64 118.02 100.55 104.06
Afghanittan 38.39 17.26 36.88 46.22 53.07 51.36 38.66 25.99 24.77 26.41
Ceylon 11.99 12.78 10.95 9.21 15.30 34.03 48.60 48.60 54.87 56.56
lndia 648.38 689.99 934.35 1169.20 1198.01 1190.48 1239.51 1010.61 838.06 901.86
Pakistan 260.60 387.73 494.12 504.45 464.60 356.05 446.31 435.81 340.68 433.03
Taiwan 120.02 82.05 78.96 52.66 54.97 43.31 87.09 85.12 86.60 72.30
Indonesia 121.31 166.39 118.91 82.39 57.19 89.55 259.22 338.51 346.34 530.72
South Korea 229.52 235.73 249.01 168.87 223.22 215.76 272.27 304.61 435.21 373.06
Malaysiat 21.36 22.88 18.86 19.13 24.45 30.16 28.04 55.21 55.62 36.84
Philippines 56.17 42,44 29.71 80.50 98.18 61.07 112.13 119.18 155.67 166.21
Thailand 28.73 38.19 35.11 32.77 49.14 54.20 68.28 82.83 122.28 136.37
South Vietnam 166.76 115.78 227.03 245.37 315.01 513.42 458.75 447.99 464.54 436.33
table 2
Annual percentage shift in gross bilateral (DAC) disbursements to 39 major recipients, 1961/62 to 1969/70
notes: * not available
source: calculated from table I
period 196 1-70, and Table 2 shows these flows in terms of their
percentage change from one year to the next.
The first noticeable feature is the considerable fluctuation in these
gross inflows. The average annual shift in the flows to the 39
countries is 22.2 per cent. This was not a general shift associated
with changes in the volume of total aid. It consisted of violent fluctu-
ations on a country-by-country basis. The picture was hardly one of
inertia.
Given the lack of stability there is a problem in defining what is to be
regarded as a major change in the volume of aid ieceived. Rather
arbitrarily, we decided to concentrate on shifts of more than 40 per
cent, either upwards or downwards, from one year to another. (At
least from the recipient's point of view one would expect this to be
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country 1961-62 1962-63 1963-64 1964-65 1965-66 1966.67 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70
Algeria -11.1 -30.6 - 17.9 .- 35.4 -14.0 -15.4 + 7.6 -14.9 +17.4
Morocco -27.1 + 0.5 - 14.5 + 22.9 -16.8 -24.0 +37.8 -17.7 +19.3
Tunisia -24.5 +15.0 - 14.4 + 23.3 -23.1 +32.9 -27.3 +31.8 0
United Arab Republic +34.5 + 9.6 + 13.4 - 48.3 -28.4 -41.4 + 5.3 -.63.1 +64.8
Cameroon * * t + 7.8 + 9.7 + 0.7 + 8.7 + 3.2 +27.0
Zaire +47.3 - 8.6 + 2.7 + 21.2 -34.2 + 4.5 -26.7 + 8.2 +13.3
Ethiopia +17.7 -11.5 - 44.4 + 25.7 +47.8 -21.3 +33.1 -12.6 + 5.0
Ghana +53.3 +68.5 + 10.6 + 56.3 +42.9 - 9.8 +16.0 -10.2 -22.5
Ivory Coast I t s - 9.9 +20.9 -13.3 +14.7 +12.9 +19.2
Kenya -23.0 +12.0 + 3.9 + 19.0 -18.7 -28.5 + 4.3 + 5.8 +20.7
Madagascar t t s - 7.5 -15.9 - 0.9 - 7.3 0 + 1.1
Malawi +28.7 +29.4 + 49.0 + 6.2 -10.5 - 4.7 -21.5 - 1.9 +16.1
Nigeria 4.9 -35.8 + 51.9 + 34.2 + 5.3 + 3.5 - 3.1 +14.8 + 9.0
Tanzania +15.4 -34.6 + 27.0 - 16.1 + 5.2 -17.0 - 6.4 + 7.4 +23.4
Uganda +25.7 -28.0 + 4.6 - 5.7 +18.3 -14.5 -10.5 + 6.3 +23.7
Zambia +78.6 - 7.7 + 73.9 - 34.5 +60.3 +51.7 -22.9 -56.2 -31.3
Dominican Republic t +53.2 - 51.0 + 71.0 -32.7 +17.0 -21.7 -20.2 + 3.8
Guatemala -39.9 +10.9 + 20.0 + 14.1 -31.5 +45.2 +12.9 -31.6 + 1.8
Mexico -40.1 -23.6 + 33.3 + 4.8 +17.1 +11.8 +27.0 -41.7 +27.8
Argentina + 7.7 -15.7 + 0.8 - 37.0 +35.3 -11.9 -46.1 +41.4 +13.2
Bolivia +27.1 +32.5 - 22.8 - 12.5 -18.3 +10.0 +43.5 -27.0 -35.1
Brazil -37.4 +10.1 + 13.7 - 0.5 +23.6 -33.5 +24.0 -19.7 + 4.5
Chile - 5.5 + 0.9 - 8.0 - 10.2 +11.4 -17.0 +42.4 -21.4 -26.4
Colombia -13.7 +32.6 - 32.6 + 21.3 +11.0 +14.2 +21.1 - 6.4 +15.2
Peru -63.4 -- 2.4 + 22.8 + 46.5 + 2.2 -25.1 -10.7 +23.7 +15.7
Venezuela +67.4 -45,9 -156.8 +170.6 +18.9 + 9.0 -19.0 +26.6 -28.5
Turkey +17.5 - 3.1 - 27.9 + 12.3 - 3.2 - 7.4 + 8.9 - 2.6 - 4.2
Iran -52.9 -31.3 - 44.5 + 34.6 +11.4 +33.5 +45.2 -14.8 + 3.4
Afghanistan -55.3 +53.2 + 20.2 + 12.9 - 3.2 -24.7 -32.8 - 4.7 + 6.2
Ceylon + 6.2 -14.3 - 15.9 + 39.8 +55.0 +30.0 0 +11.4 + 3.0
India + 6.0 +26.2 + 20.1 + 2.4 - 0.6 + 4.0 -18.5 -17.1 + 7.1
Pakistan +32.8 +21.5 + 2.0 - 7.9 -23.4 +20.2 - 2.4 -22.5 +21.3
Taiwan -31.6 - 3.8 - 33.3 + 4.2 -21.1 +45.6 - 2.3 + 1.7 -18.5
Indonesia +27.1 -28.5 - 30.7 - 30.6 +36.1 +65.5 +23.4 + 2.3 +34.7
South Korea + 2.6 + 5.3 - 32.2 + 24.4 - 3.3 +20.8 +10.6 +30.0 -14.3
Malaysia + 6.6 -17.6 + 1.4 + 21.8 +19.6 - 7.0 +49.2 + 0.7 -33.8
Philippines -24.4 -30.0 + 63.1 + 18.0 -37.8 +45.5 + 5.9 +23.4 + 6.4
Thailand +24.8 - 8.1 - 6.7 + 33.3 + 9.3 +20.6 +17.6 +32.3 +10.3
Sough Vietnam + 5.1 +22.6 + 7.5 + 22.1 +38.6 -10.6 - 2.3 + 3.6 - 6.1
regarded as a major variation). On this basis, 45 out of a total of 341
shifts can be regarded as major changes, although nine of these
should perhaps be excluded since they occurred in the period
1961-63 in countries which were just beginning to receive substantial
aid flows. A further ten arc excluded to avoid double-counting due
to the pipeline problem, where a sudden shift in commitments takes
two years to work itself out into disbursements, or where a second
shift reverses the direction of an increase or decrease back to the
pre-shift level.
This leaves 26 major volume changes from one year to another, and
it is possible to distinguish four patterns of aid inflow associated with
them:
Short-term fluctuations from a continuing norm: the upward
shift in the Dominican Republic in 1962 and three downward
shifts - UAR in 1968, Afghanistan in 1962, and Argentina in
1968.
Shifts which set a new level of aid which was more or less sus-
tained for at least the subsequent four years. Eleven of these are
upward shifts - Ghana in 1965, Nigeria in 1964, Ceylon in 1966,
Indonesia in 1967, Philippines in 1964, Malawi in 1964, Ethiopia
in 1966, Congo (Zaire) in 1962, Peru in 1965, Iran in 1968, and
Taiwan in 1967. Two are negative shifts - Iran in 1962 and UAR
in 1965.
Eight shifts which were not followed by an immediate reversal,
but where over the four subsequent years the volume either rose
or fell back close to the pre-shift level. Upward shifts of this type
occurred in Zambia in 1966, Guatemala in 1967, Bolivia in 1968,
Chile in 1968 and Malaysia in 1968, while three downward shifts
occurred, in Ethiopia in 1964, and in Mexico in 1962 and again in
1969.
One shift, in the Dominican Republic in 1965, stands on its own.
Following a 71 per cent upward shift there is a 33 per cent
fall-back in aid volume, and it is the level set then that is more or
less sustained.
These disbursement patterns were checked against commitments to
see if the categories remained demarcated (or if they were largely a
function of the pipeline). When this was done, at least for the shifts
which occurred after 1965 (no reliable and comparable commitment
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figures are available before that year), it became clear that no firm
classification of patterns of aid inflow is really possible. Commitment
behaviour is considerably more erratic than disbursement behaviour,
and only two of the disbursement patterns remain.
On commitment figures there are considerably more large, single-year
upward shifts followed by an immediate drop back in the level of
commitments. This is not surprising, since a single-year commitment
is often made to allow for a planned disbursement rate over a
number of years. This is especially true of British aid, so that this
type of pattern occurs clearly in Kenya, Malawi, Zambia and to some
extent in Malaysia, although in the latter the addition of US assis-
tance sustained the total commitment increase for a few years.
Similar short-term increases also occurred in Chile in 1967,
Guatemala in 1968, Ethiopia in 1966 and Peru in 1966. The only
other disbursement category to reappear with commitment data is
that of the large sustained shift, and the number of shifts which do
fit into this category is reduced from thirteen to five - Ghana,
Ceylon, Indonesia and Nigeria (with the exception of a major fall
back in commitments in 1967) having sustained increases in aid
volume, and UAR a sustained negative shift.
Sustained Aid Increases
The fact that this category, which corresponds with our initial
hypothesis, turns out to include very few countries, is not very en-
couraging from the recipient's point of view, if we assume that most
recipients have a concern to increase the amount of aid they receive
and sustain this increase over time. Furthermore, a closer look at the
circumstances associated with the shifts in this category reduces its
general relevance still further. Three of the four shifts - those in
Ghana, Ceylon and Indonesia - occurred in somewhat similar
circumstances: each closely followed the establishment of new
governments, considerably more pro-Western and less prone to
radical rhetoric than their predecessors. Another feature the three
countries had in common was that the advent of the new govern-
ments coincided with a major resource crisis in the form of an acute
shortage of foreign exchange, and Indonesia and Ghana had, in
addition, enormous and unpayable debts to many donors. (It is
interesting to note that one of the earliest large and sustained in-
creases in aid volume to an individual country, if we ignore strategic
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aid of the kind that was prevalent in the early 1950s, occurred in
1958 in India, following that country's foreign exchange crisis). All
three countries undoubtedly had a foreign exchange crisis prior to
the election or coup which heralded the arrival of the new, favoured
regime, but this had not resulted in substantial doses of foreign aid.
This reinforces the picture presented in the existing static studies of
aid distribution. It is almost a truism that economic arguments alone,
in the absence of foreign policy considerations, will not cause aid to
flow and in these three countries it was the arrival of a new
government, which donors had foreign policy reasons to support,
rather than the foreign exchange crisis itself, that was the major
impetus to the increased aid.
Several other characteristics were common to the situations of
Ghana, Ceylon and Indonesia. The new governments in each case
indicated their new political and foreign policy outlooks and their
desire fo assistance in their programmes of economic reorganization
by actively seeking aid from Western donors and international
organizations, all three embarking initially on stabilization pro-
grammes drawn up with the guidance of the IMF or World Bank,
later followed by development programmes. Another common
feature is the associated emphasis on 'planning' and the establish-
ment or reorganization of central planning ministries for this pur-
pose. A further common element is the emphasis by the new govern-
ments on new attitudes towards, and the encouragement of, foreign
private investment. Whether or not action met words on this issue,
this new emphasis, like the establishment of planning ministries, was
clearly part of the public relations effort which attracted the support
of Western donors. Not only did they get increased aid, but all three
countries got a large proportion of programme aid designed to help
them overcome their exchange crises. This was not achieved without
a price - the attendant acceptance of the 'guidance' of the IMF or
World Bank over economic policy-making is clearly apparent, even
from the reports of these organizations, as was the tension created
later when the donors wished to phase out programme assistance in
favour of more project aid.
Nigeria does not fall into quite the same category, in that its
increased aid level was not attendant upon a change of government
and resource crisis, but rather accompanied the introduction of
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Nigeria's first National Development Plan (1962-68), which marked
the commencement of Nigeria's extended search for external re-
sources outside the established colonial relationship. The 1964
increase in aid indicated the Western donors' response to Nigeria's
request, coupled with its attempt at coherent development planning.
An additional cause of the donors' willingness to extend aid to
Nigeria was undoubtedly the coincidental discovery of the wealth of
Nigeria's natural resources, particularly its oil, and its encouragement
of foreign private investment in extractive industries. Nigeria rapidly
became the African 'success story' of the early 1960s.
One can only speculate on how much the donors' willingness to
increase their aid to Nigeria was a result of Nigeria's 'good' economic
management and how much of it was due to the discovery of
Nigeria's resource endowment; but clearly the possession of resources
of interest to donors; and the willingness to allow foreign business to
exploit these resources, is a major advantage to recipients, if
maximising aid is a desired goal. In this context, it is noticeable that
of the other three countries in this category, only Indonesia is still
sustaining large donor interests and ever-increasing aid flows, and
only Indonesia has large quantities of valuable mineral resources and
has actively encouraged a large increase in foreign private invest-
ment.2
The DAC, in stating its inertia thesis, saw the resultant problem for
the recipients as being their limited room for manoeuvre, it 'being
largely limited to the increment in aid volume from one year to
another' (DAC 1969 Review). But it would seem that the limitations
are even greater. If it is true that the only countries which are likely
to receive large and sustained increases in aid are those which are
already in desperate trouble, and which have changed, either as a
result of domestic upheavals resulting in a coup or through an
election, to a government which has a political complexion more
favoured by Western governments (or some of them) than its
predecessor, and which is willing to implement policies favoured by
those Western governments and accept substantial leverage over the
direction of economic policy-making, or which are fortunate enough
2According to Indonesian figures, the inflow of foreign private capital increased
from $17m in 1969 to $137m in 1970.
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to possess vital natural resources, then the picture is far from
encouraging. Few countries would go to the extreme of dislodging an
existing government solely to increase their volume of external
assistance, while the discovery of valuable natural resources is not
something than can be engineered as part of a strategy for attracting
resources. For most countries then, the likelihood of obtaining a
major increase in aid would appear minimal, and of sustaining any
increase that does occur, even remoter.
Mikesell, in discussing the geographical distribution of aid, concluded
that, given the impossibility of discerning any economic rationale for
the existing distribution of aid, and the difficulty of deciding upon a
commonly agreed and accepted rationale for an alternative distribu-
tion, "...donors should pay more attention to the allocation of aid
for high priority and strategic purposes within countries, than to the
allocation of aid among countries, as a means of maximising the
impact of aid" (Mikesell, 1968). Such a conclusion, while appropri-
ate, should perhaps be restated from the recipients' viewpoint. Given
the lack of room for manoeuvre possessed by recipients in relation to
the volume of aid they might receive, efforts geared to the allocation
of aid for high priority and strategic purposes within their countries
are more likely to be effective than efforts addressed to the volume
as a means of maximising the impact of aid. It should be their
priorities and their strategies they are concerned with, not those of
the donors, either individually or collectively, and only in firmly
establishing this will recipient countries have any room for
manoeuvre. To put it more bluntly, a strategy of 'pleasing the
donors' will not attract more aid. It will merely divert attention from
the need to get the best value out of the amount of aid.
Short-term Aid Increases
In addition to these few sustained upward shifts, we have observed
several large upward volume movements which were not sustained.
Six countries received a disbursement increase of this sort - the
Dominican Republic in 1962 with a one-year increase; and five -
Zambia in 1966,Guatemala in 1967, Bolivia in 1968, Chile in 1968,
and Malaysia in 1968 - with slightly more sustained increases, but
with the volume falling off again within three to four years. On
commitment figures eight countries had large short-term upward
shifts in volume in the period 1965-70 - Zambia in 1967, Guatemala
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in 1968, Chile in 1967, Kenya in 1967, Malawi in 1965, Ethiopia in
1966 and Peru in 1966 having one-year fluctuations, and Malaysia
having an increase sustained for a three year period from 1966 to
1968. It is apparent that disbursement patterns in these countries are
largely explained by the commitment trends, slow disbursements
sustaining the increase, for instance in Malawi and Ethiopia, over at
least four years, or faster disbursements causing annual receipts to
fall back after two or three years, as in the Zambian or Chilean case.
Hence, the discussion in this section should relate to commitment
figures, and can refer only to movements after 1965, reliable
commitment data not being available before then.
For those countries where the increase was largely a function of an
increase in British aid there are relatively clear-cut explanations. The
Kenyan, Malawian and Zambian increases were all the result of a
large British commitment given to result in a planned disbursement
rate. The Malawian increase coincided with the granting of indepen-
dence and the breaking-up of the Central African Federation, whilst
the Zambian increase was the result of a large British commitment
following the Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence. In
Kenya, British disbursements had been falling in the period 1965-67
due to a reduction in the scale of land transfer and resettlement and
the fact that initial drawings under compensation and commutation
loans were heaviest in the immediate post-independence years. The
large 1967 commitment mostly consisted of a new $51 million land
transfer loan.
The initial increase in Malaysia is largely accounted for by an increase
in US and Japanese commitments, the former rising from $4 million
to $41 million, returning to around $6 million in 1968. The increase
coincided with the introduction of Malaysia's new Five Year Plan
(1966-70), which was accompanied by extensive efforts by Malaysia
to increase its foreign borrowing for development financing. But the
increase, unlike the similar increase in Nigeria, was not to be
sustained, and the 1969 mid-term review of the Plan expresses
disappointment at the failure to attract the amount of foreign
resources envisaged by the Plan. Official documents at this time also
stress the aid utilization problems that resulted from disbursement
delays and the fact that the majority of offers were not aid but
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commercial credits. Only a large British commitment of $64.5 million
in 1968, which was special assistance in connection with the
withdrawal of British forces from Malaysia, sustained the 1966
increase for a third year, the overall commitment level then falling
sharply, from $80 million in 1968 to $33 million in 1969.
Where the increase is largely a function of an increase in US aid, the
explanations are often less obvious. This is partly because DAC
commitment data are on a calendar year basis and do not always
reflect trends accurately (US programmes are established on a fiscal
year basis), and partly due to the way in which the USA often
attempts to exert leverage through its aid commitments, which gives
rise to very sharp short-term changes, induced by changes in US
attitudes rather than by identifiable events. This is particularly true
in Latin America where the tendency to support congenial govern-
ments though aid, and then withdraw support as governments
repeatedly change, creates a confusing picture which is further
compounded by disbursement delays: even if aid is cut off the
amount in the pipeline usually remains usable, so that cut-offs and
increases (because of disbursement delays) are often not manifested
until sometime after the policy change, and often not at all.
Aid Flows to Latin America
Average annual fluctuations are considerably higher in Latin America
than elsewhere. Whereas the annual average change in disbursements
to the 39 major recipients for the period 1961-70 was 22.2 per cent,
that to the ten Latin American countries amongst them was 27 per
cent. On commitments, taking a slightly smaller sample of 25
countries, the overall annual average change from 1965 to 1970 was
38.7 per cent and for Latin American countries it was 42.5 per cent
3Because of problems concerning the comparability of the data, analysis of the
figures for conimitinents is confined to the following 25 countries: Ethiopia,
Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Morocco, Nigeria, Tanzania, UAR, Zaire, Zambia,
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil. Chile, Guatemala, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Peru,
Afghanistan, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Taiwan. Others
which could have been induded on a comparable basis did not in fact experience
large shifts in disbursements.
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The predominance of US flows to Latin American countries would
suggest itself as an explanation, but raises the question whether it is
because US aid flows are generally more volatile, or because US aid is
more volatile in Latin America than elsewhere, or because the
predominance of the US gave rise to exceptionally volatile flows
from other donors.
Undoubtedly US aid is, on the whole, more dominant in Latin
America than elsewhere, in the sense of constituting a greater
proportion of total resource inflows. In our sample of 39 countries,
on disbursement figures for 1961-70, US aid constituted an average
of 53.1 per cent of the total aid flows to each country, ranging from
a low of 8.1 per cent in Algeria and Malawi to 99.2 per cent in the
Dominican Republic. The average proportion of US aid in the total
flows to the ten Latin American countries was 80.5 per cent, only
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Peru receiving less than this.
It will be recalled that the annual average shift in total flows to all 39
countries was 22.2 per cent and in the ten Latin American countries
it was 27 per cent. The equivalent figures for the US alone are 30.2
per cent and 28.2 per cent respectively. This suggests: (i) overall, US
aid flows are considerably more volatile than total flows, and (ii) in
Latin America US flows are rather more stable than elsewhere, and
only slightly more volatile than total flows.
But averages can be misleading, and a closer observation of US flows
to the ten Latin American countries shows a major change in the
middle of the decade. Until 1965 the average annual percentage
change in the US flows to these ten countries was in each year
considerably higher than it was to the other 29 countries. For each
year from 1965 onwards the reverse was true US flows to Latin
America were far more stable than elsewhere, and between 1969 and
1970 the average change was only 12.9 per cent. In the second half
of the 1960s, the volatility of aid to Latin America was attributable
to the behaviour of subsidiary donors'
Negative Shifts, Cut-offs and the Compensating Effect of Subsidiary
Donors
The disbursement figures for the 39 countries indicate the occur-
rence of only a few large falls in aid volume, and particularly few
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large arid sustained falls (see table 1). There are only two examples of
the latter - in Iran after 1962 and UAR after 1965.
While there are only a very few examples of large downward
movements in aid being sustained for a considerable period, there
have been several sizeable cut-offs in aid from the major donor which
have been compensated by an increase in aid from other sources. One
implication of this is that major and sustained cut-offs, the threat or
fear of which sometimes dominates the thinking of both donor and
recipient agencies, has in fact occurred only rarely. A sustained
decline in aid has not occurred as dramatically as many would see it,
but rather more gradually, as in the decline of French aid to Algeria
from 1964 or US aid to Taiwan in the early 1960s. One possible
conclusion is that recipient countries could be less concerned with
the possibility of a major suspension or decline of aid, which occurs
relatively infrequently, and more concerned with attempting to
diversify their sources of aid in a manner which ensures some
regularity in inflows from secondary donors, and which may com-
pensate for any decline that may occur in receipts from the primary
donor.
Multilateral and Bilateral Aid
In general, according to DAC figures, the countries favoured by
bilateral donors have also received relatively large amounts of aid per
capita from multilateral agencies (DAC 1968 Review). To ascertain
whether, within this general trend, movements in multilateral aid
coincided with the bilateral pattern, an examination was made of the
trends in the total amounts (as opposed to per capita amounts) of
multilateral aid receipts in relation to the trends in bilateral receipts
in. the 39 countries, and this revealed three main categories. This
categorization encompasses 26 countries, 13 being excluded because
of the relative unimportance of multilateral receipts in their total
inflows. (India and Pakistan might have been excluded on these
grounds, but have been included because of the large absolute
amounts involved). Table 3 gives the gross multilateral disbursement
figures for the 39 countries.
The largest category covers those countries in which multilateral
receipts generally followed the same trend as bilateral receipts. The
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ten countries in this category are: Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Carneroon,
Colombia, Thailand, Nigeria, Tanzania, Iran, India, and Pakistan. In
the first five of these countries both multilateral and bilateral
receipts increased (with occasional exceptions) steadily from year to
ycar throughout the decade. A similar pattern occurred in Nigeria,
with the exception of a falling.off in multilateral receipts in 1969
and 1970, whilst bilateral receipts received a fresh impetus following
the civil war. In Tanzania multilateral aid generally increased
annually after 1964, whilst there was some fluctuation in bilateral
receipts. The trend in the level of multilateral receipts in Iran closely
follows the bilateral aid trend, first falling, then rising again from the
middle of the decade, In India both trends are similar, both reaching
a peak in 1967, then falling back during the rest of the decade. In
Pakistan, multilateral receipts, like bilateral aid, rose in the early part
of the decade, but the former reached their peak somewhat later - in
1967,as compared with the bilateral peak in 1964.
table 3
Gross multilateral disbursements to 39 major recIpients 1961 70
LIS $ mil/ion
source. unpublrshed DAC material
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country 1961 1962 1963 7964 7965 1966 7967 7968 7969 7970
Algeria 0,01 1.31 5.05 23.42 2.32 6.76 6.15 9.03 16.64 13.87
Morocco 0.78 1.82 4.13 4.94 10.18 16.11 10.76 15.75 17.86 20.14
Tunisia 0.85 1.02 3.42 5.11 5.15 7.55 7.83 14,00 18.64 26.06
United Arab Republic 17.75 26.36 9.27 10.12 9,73 2.99 3.50 9.32 9.70 18.58
Cameroon 0.65 4,43 5.43 7.74 13.10 12.57 10.61 14.27 11.76 29.37
Zaire 30.94 6.72 9.61 19.70 16.10 6.17 9.89 10.90 19.62 19.32
Ethiopia 3.59 3.85 5.03 7.16 13.13 14.10 11.66 15.71 18.63 12.52
Ghana 0.76 1.05 11.13 17.71 15.19 7.76 3.74 3.25 10.65 7.64
Ivory Coast 2.37 6.98 7.14 7.41 11.25 11.42 8.22 10.14 13.77 20.11
Kenya 2.09 2.88 2.22 2.82 3.29 12.85 23.64 22.11 23.51 22.96
Madagascar 1.44 3.95 1.99 13.14 12.90 11.58 13.06 14.73 17.88 21.44
Malawi t 0.03 g 0.22 0.19 0.74 0.76 3.11 5.88 10.69
Nigeria 4.85 1.66 4.30 13.00 28.14 36.33 39.51 41.29 34.57 28.88
Tanzania 0.29 3.06 1,19 4.18 4.11 6.39 9.07 8.36 13.19 13.96
Uganda 4.13 2.12 3.06 4.45 3.06 2.58 2.31 2.21 9.62 8.34
Zambia 0.13 0.21 0.20 0.32 2.80 2.53 4.93 5.51 11.82 8.52
Dominican Republic 0.15 0.29 0.98 0,61 0.88 1.66 3.37 5.18 12.85 22.15
Guatemala 0.65 1.54 1.92 1.25 2.16 374 5.23 4.01 10.88 12.56
Menico 12.14 34.21 100.06 92.23 44.82 104.26 90.98 92.68 138.21 188.28
Argentina 1.01 28.65 68.14 54.92 32.11 *9.09 23.62 38.16 85.74 80.41
Bolivia 3.12 6.10 6.86 5.71 7.00 10.41 7.01 6W 1018 9.68
Brazil 27.44 26.11 30.49 21.69 28.63 48.69 84.12 90.50 157.18 186.42
CItil. 9.02 16.44 24.38 33.49 35.63 37.99 33.58 42.33 44.36 64.91CoIowi. 27.67 40.69 49.38 72.24 40.45 52.35 66.98 60.24 74.95 113.09
11.02 11.45 18.67 28.80 V.98 26.03 30.96 21.30 34.39 30.97
luela 0.72 2.14 18.03 32.50 31.95 57.25 5798 62.28 30.31 30.09
Turkey 1.38 1,57 2.90 9.33 13.03 19.43 22.91 26.20 75.59 58.01
Iran 33,67 37.67 13.24 6.46 10.71 20.88 22.55 26.42 28.14 35.34
Afghanistan 1.62 1.87 1.99 2.15 2.76 3.88 5.33 4.09 5.21 5.51
Ceylon 4.03 6.70 5.68 4.10 3.58 2.85 2.68 2.24 5.49 7.84
India 75.02 100.06 114,97 148.12 246.77 201.90 276.19 137.22 181.99 114.69
Pakrstan 19.01 22.26 31.86 36.70 81.44 88.51 132,21 120.73 98.26 107.86
Taiwan 0.47 3.28 5.07 6.10 13,72 20.60 9,13 12,64 30.36 38.41
Indonesia 1.52 1.45 0.75 3.38 1.64 0.35 084 9.04 14.34 15.19
South Korea 0.23 0.68 13.39 3.30 2.39 2.04 2.81 11.53 16.22 18.98
Malaysia 3.10 10,72 1.24 18.45 15,47 24.59 27.55 27.62 21.06 24.93
Philippines 2.13 6.86 11.45 12.54 21.43 18.41 21.16 27.32 29.31 22.98
Thailand 13.72 18.88 14,26 17.71 13.92 24.01 26.12 36.79 46.64 40.74
South Vietnam 0.55 0.59 0.44 * g 0.70 0.62 1.32 1.98 1.14
In the second category were eight countries Kenya, IIalawi,
Zambia, Dominican Republic, Turkey, Madagascar, Taiwan and
Ghana - where multilateral aid partly evened out the variations in
bilateral receipts. The first five of these exhibit a similar pattern; that
of multilateral aid receipts increasing considerably in the last two or
three years of the decade, coinciding with a falling-off of bilateral
receipts. In several instances the amount of multilateral aid in the
first half of the decade was negligible or non-existent.
Another eight countries fall into a third category in which the trend
in multilateral aid levels appears to be quite independent of the
bilateral trend, neither complementing nor opposing it. With the
exception of Malaysia, all countries in this category are Latin
American - Guatemala, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Mexico, Argentina and
Venezuela.
A more detailed analysis of the relationship between bilateral and
multilateral receipts would be required in order to draw any firm
conclusions about the balancing effect of multilateral aid in indi-
vidual countries and its overall geographical distribution in relation
to bilateral distribution. But this preliminary examination would
seem to indicate that, at an individual country level, multilateral
receipts tend on the whole to follow a similar trend to bilateral
flows. This is in line with the DAC contention that multilateral flows
generally fail to even out irregularities in bilateral flows, but the
conclusion is weaker in relation to trends in absolute amounts and on
an individual country basis than it is ih relation to per capita receipts
averaged over a period of time and on a global scale.
There were several examples of the level of multilateral aid rising as
bilateral aid fell, and vice versa, and in Latin America in particular
there was no evidence of a distinct relationship between bilateral and
multilateral flows. A detailed analysis of the sources of multilateral
aid, and, particularly in Latin America, of the relative contributionof
IBRD and 1DB, would be necessary to gain a complete picture. It has
been suggested by some commentators4 that both these organiza-
tions are instruments of US policy. If this were true, one would
4Teresa Hayter, Aid as Imperialism, Penguin, 1971, and numerous other writers
of the same persuasion.
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expect receipts from them to exhibit a firm relationship to receipts
from the US, but it appears in fact that receipts from the two
institutions rarely fluctuate in the same direction as each other, or in
any noticeable relationship to either total or US flows.
Conclusions
There are several conclusions about the geographical distribution of
aid which are common to most writers on the subject, viz., that the
existing distribution (i) is primarily based on a mixture of donor
motives, particularly their political, historical, commercial and
strategic interests in particular recipient countries; (ii) is therefore
inequitable in terms of the wide disparities in per capita aid receipts;
(iii) is 'irrational' in terms of being unrelated to any developmental
or economic criteria; (iv) is statistically explicable only in terms of
the small country effect.
While these conclusions seem solidly established, it is contended that
the emphasis on the distribution issue, and attempts by economists
to propound a more 'rational' distribution, is misplaced, and has
given rise to what is likely to continue to be a fruitless search. Even if
broad agreement were to be obtained that developmental criteria
should be given greater, or even primary, consideration, there is little
likelihood of agreement being reached on which criteria to adopt.
The DAC has perpetuated the belief that because the non-
developmental links between donors and recipients are so strong,
inertia is a major factor in maintaining the inequitable distribution
that exists. While this is regrettable, it at least has the merit, the DAC
would have us believe, of enabling recipient countries to predict the
future volume of their aid receipts. To the extent that non-
developmental links explain which groups of countries receive large
inflows of aid from particular donors, and will continue to do so, the
inertia thesis does have some applicability. However, it is much less
applicable from the point of view of a developing country which is
trying to forecast its aid receipts as a basis for drawing up a
development programme.
The emphasis in previous studies on the stability and predictability
of aid receipts due to inertia springs from their tendency to analyse
the geographical distribution in terms of classes or groups of
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countries or regions, and the failure to recognise that the major
allocation decisions made by donors are concerned with individual
countries, rather than groups of countries. This study has attempted
to analyse the changes that occur in the level of aid receipts of
individual countries. Although the large fluctuations in receipts from
year to year make it difficult to categorise countries into coherent
groupings based on these changes, the exercise has led to a few broad
conclusions about the nature of the distribution process.
The main conclusion concerns the very limited opportunities for
recipients to increase the total volume of their aid receipts. Two
main types of volume increase are observable a small number of
sharp increases which occurred as a result of the donors' response to
a specific internal situation, and which were sustained for some time;
and a larger number of sharp increases which lasted for only a short
time before the volume of receipts returned to its former level.
Both types of increase were usually the result of country-specific
situations, usually more political than economic in nature, and
contingent upon such factors as: replacement of a troublesome
regime by a government deemed more co-operative with donor
agencies (Ceylon, Indonesia, Ghana); approval by the donors of the
policies of an incumbent regime (Ceylon, Indonesia, Ghana, Nigeria,
Peru, Chile); some major disturbance, either domestic or external
(Malaysia, Bangladesh, Malawi, Zambia); and the possession of
valuable natural resources coupled with willingness to allow foreign
exploitation of them (Indonesia, Nigeria, Chile). Some are also
situations which are likely to change abruptly; for example, the
disappearance of an approved government or a change in its policies
may result in a rapid falling-off of the aid level, as occurred in Chile
and Peru. Since these are events over which recipients have little
control, and would rarely be fostered deliberately merely out of a
desire to increase the amount of aid received, it would seem that the
opportunities for recipients to exercise firm control over the level of
aid, and to gain and sustain any substantial increase in that level, are
minimal.
From the recipient viewpoint it is clear that there are major
difficulties in devising a successful strategy to increase the aid
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volume, and it would seem that they should concentrate on a
strategy related to the composition rather than the amount of aid,
and concerned with the efficient allocation throughout their
economy of the resources available. Strategies aimed at attracting
more aid are less likely to repay the effort put into them than
strategies aimed at attracting 'better' aid.
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